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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ELMA ARLENE RAMMELL,

:

Petitioner-Appellant
vs.

:

SAMUEL SMITH, Warden
Utah State Prison,

:

Defendant-Respondent

Case No. 14618

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Elma Arlene Rammell, appeals the dismissal
of her petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT]
The appellant, Elma Arlene Rammell, filed a petition for
a Writ of Habeas Corpus in Third District Court.

The matter came

on for hearing of the Respondent's motion to dismiss before the
Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., District Court Judge on Thursday,
April 29, 1976.

The Respondent's motion was granted following

argument by opposing counsel, and the Writ was dismissed with
prejudice.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Order of Dismissal
rendered below and a remand to the Third Judicial District Court
for a new hearing on the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Writ of Habeas Corpus in this case petitions for relief
from findings of Guilty by reason of pleas of guilty in two separate
cases in Third District Court for the State of Utah.

The charge

in both instances was that of obtaining a controlled substance by
fraud and misrepresentation in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§58-37-8 (4)(ii) (1953 as amended).
The appellant entered a plea of guiltjr to the first charge
under the aforementioned section on the 9th day of March, 1973
before the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr.

On the 6th day of April,

1973 Judge Baldwin committed the complainant to prison for a term
not to exceed five years.

The complainant served approximately

26 months and on the 102 day of June, 1975 the defendant was released
on parole.
The defendant was subsequently rearrested on the 23rd day
of October, 1975 and charged again with violation of Title 59
Chapter 37, Section 8(4)(ii) Utah Code Annotated by obtaining
a controlled substance, to-wit;:
ation, fraud and disception.

Dalmone and Phenaphen by misrepresent-

On the 6th day of January, 1976 the

defendant entered a plea of guilty before the Honorable Gordon R. Hall
and on the 20th day of January, 1976 the defendant was sentenced
to a term not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
Subsequent to the entry of the second plea of guilty, the defendant's
parole was revoked on the first charge and she now resides in the
Utah State Prison under committments from the Utah State Parole
-2-

Board and from Judge Hall of the Third District; Court in and for
Salt Lake

County, State of Utah.

On the 8th day of March, 1976, the Petitioner filed in
Third District in connection with the second case a Motion requesting
Vacation of Sentence.

The requested relief was resentencing under

Utah Code Ann. §58-17-14.13 (1953 as amended) to a maximum of one
year to be served in the Salt Lake County Jail.

That motion was

denied by the Honorable Gordon R. Hall for lack of jurisdiction.
On the 27th day of May the appellant filed a Petition
for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, which came on for hearing on the
respondent's motion to dismiss on April 29, 19716.
ARGUMENT OF POINTS OF LAW
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT RELIEF FROM
A SENTENCE IMPOSED UNDER THE GREATER OF TWO PENALTY
PROVISIONS PASSED SIMULTANEOUSLY BY THE LEGISLATURE.
The petitioner was convicted by plea of uttering a forged
prescription to obtain the drugs Dalmone and Phenaphen.

The

defendant's act clearly falls within the ambit of the Pharmacy Act,
Utah Code Ann. 58-17-14.13 (1953 as amended), which states in
pertinent part:
No person shall obtain or possess or attempt to possess, any
drug or medicine intended for use by man which, under the
laws of this state or the laws of the United States or
lawful regulations thereunder, has been designed as unsafe
for use except under the supervision of a practitioner
licensed to administer or prescribe such drugs or medicines:
(1) by fraud, deceit, misrepresentation or subterfuge . . .
The penalty for this offense is set forth in Utah'Code
Ann. §58-17-26 (1953 as amended) which specifically states that:
-3-

Any person who violates sections . . . 58-17-14.13, shall
be punished by a fine of not more than $1,000 or imprisonment
in the county jail for not more than one (1) year or
both.l
It is important to note that this penalty provision was
amended and increased by the legislature in 1971.

Prior to 1971,

a violation of Section 58-17-14.13 was punishable as a simple
misdemeanor with a maximum of six (6) months in the county jail and
a fine of $299, or both.
That same legislature, during the same session, passed the
"Utah Controlled Substance Act'" which created the problem that faces
the Court in this case.

The act of defendant in misrepresentation

fraud and deception to obtain the drugs Dalmone and Phenaphen
also constitutes a violation of Section 58-37-8(4)(a)(iii) of the
Utah Controlled Substance Act which states:
It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly and
intentionally . . . (ii) to acquire or obtain possession
or the administration of a controlled substance by
misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception or
subterfuge.
The penalty for a violation of the above section is set
forth in Section 58-37-8(4)(b) Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended),
which provides for imprisonment of not more than five years or a
2
fine of not more than $5,000 or both.

1. A Class A Misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. §§76-3-204(1) and
76-3-301(3) (Supp. 1975).
2. A Third Degree Felony under Utah'Code Ann. §§76-3-203(3) and
76-3-301(2) (Supp. 1975).

-4-

Since the penalty for defendants act falls within conflicting
provisions of two (2) acts passed in the same legislative session,
the determination of the proper penalty should be made within the
guidelines set out by the court in State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d
343, 453 P.2d 146 (1969) and followed in State v. Fair, 23 Utah 2d
34, 456 P.2d 168 (1969) .
The Shondel case involved an overlap of the Drug Abuse Control
Law and the Narcotic Drug Act which were both enacted during the
same session of the 1967 Legislature of Utah.
with possession of the drug LSD.

Shondel was charged

The Drug Abuse Control Law provided

a misdemeanor penalty for that offense, while the Narcotic Drug
Act made it a felony.

On appeal the court held that Shondel was

entitled to the lesser of the two penalties.

In writing the opinion

of the Supreme Court Chief Justice Crockett based his rationale
upon the principle of equal protection of law and the principle that
a penal statute "should be sufficiently certain that persons with
ordinary intelligence who desire to obey the law may know how to
conduct themselves in conformity with it.'1

22 ptah 2d at 356,

453 P.2d at 148.
Section 58-37-19 of the Controlled Substance Act states in
its pertinent part:
. . . whenever the . . . penalties imposed relating to
substances controlled by this act shall be or appear
to be in conflict with Title 58, Chapter 17 or may other
laws of this state, the provision of this act shall be
controlling.
It may be argued that this provision constitutes a clear
legislative mandate compelling the prosecutor and trial court to proceed
against defendant by imposing the felony penalty.
-5-

This argument

overlooks the details of the fact situation faced by the Supreme
Court in Shondel.
In Shondel it was argued that the felony penalty of the
Narcotic Drug Act should prevail because of a section in the Drug
Abuse Control Law which provided that:
Notwithstanding the other provisions of the act, whenever
the possession sale, transfer, or dispensing of any drug
or substance would constitute an offense under this act
and also constitutes an offense under the laws of this state
relating to the possession, sale, transfer, or dispensing of
narcotic drugs or marijuana, such offense shall not be
punishable under this act but shall be punishable under such
other provision of law.
In Shondel, the Supreme Court refused to accept the argument
that the proceeding quoted provision cured the overlap problem
of the two legislative acts being considered.

The reasoning set

out in the opinion of the Supreme Court was that the "reference
to such other provisions of the law" leaves one concerned with
compliance with the law to search elsewhere to discover whether
some "other provision of law1 . . . prescribed some other penalty."
22 Utah at 346, 453 P.2d at 147, 148.
In the instant case, this reasoning applies with even greater
force.

The citizen concerned with an understanding of the law is

not even sent "searching" as was the case with the overlap involved
in Shondel.

The legislature of 1971 increased the penalty for a

violation of Section 58-17-14.13 of the Pharmacy Act, and in the
same session passed the Controlled Substance Act.

Yet, nowhere in

the Pharmacy Act is reference made to the fact that another law

-6-

has been enacted to supercede Section 58-17-14.13 which ostensibly
remains in effect with more force than it previously had.
It may now be seen how truly analogous the Shondel and Fair
cases are.

The penalties at issue in this case were enacted in the

same legislative session.

Defendants conduct falls squarely within

the terms of Section 58-17-14.13 of the Pharmacy Act.

Imposition

of the more severe penalty found in the Controlled Substance Act
is repugnant to equal protection of law and the principle that the
law should provided reasonably clear notice of the sanctions
annexed to the commission of a given act.
If there is any distinction between Shondel and the instant
case it is that the Pharmacy Act now being considered does not
even send a researcher "searching" for conflicting provisions
located elsewhere in the Code.
Shondel

The reasoning of the Court in

therefore applies a fortiori in the instant case.
POINT II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONER
SHOULD HAVE SOUGHT HER REMEDY BY APPEAL AND WAS NOT
ENTITLED TO CONSIDERATION OF THE ISSUE ON PETITION
FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
This Court has repeatedly expressed its concern over the
increased use of habeas corpus writs as substitutes for timely appeal
proceedings,

See Brown v. Turner, 440 P.2d 968, 21 Utah 2d 96 (1968);

Jaramillo v. Turner , 465 P.2d 343, 24 Utah 2d 19 (1970);
Zumbrunnen v. Turner 497 P.2d 34, 27 Utah 2d 428 (1972).

A substantial

line of cases state quite clearly that matters which were known or
should have been known by counsel and defendant at the time of trial
should have been disposed of by the regular appellate procedure.
-7-

See Brown v. Turner, supra; Johnson v. Turner 473 P.2d 901, 24 Utah
2d 439 (1970).

This court has universally held that appeal is the

regular procedure for review of injustices and irregularities in
lower court proceedings.
However, this Court has always recognized that writs of
habeas corpus serve a valuable purpose and that they are both
historically and presently integral to the protection of the rights
of the citizenry.

Thompson v. Harris, 144 P.2d 761, 107 Utah

99 (1943), rehearing denied 152 P.2d 91, 107 Utah 99, certiorari denie
65 S. Ct. 676, 324 U.S. 815, 89 L. Ed. 1406.

The Court has also

recognized valid exceptions to the above rules limiting habeas
corpus following the appeal period.

As the Court said in Johnson v.

Turner, supra, at p. 904;
"Where is appears that there has been such miscarriage of
justice that it would be unconscionable not to re-examine
a conviction, and that for some justifiable reason an appeal
was not taken thereon, we do not regard rules of procedure
as being so absolute as to prevent us from correcting any
such obvious injustice.'1
However, Appellant urges strenuously that the case at bar
does not resemble the writs from persons incarcerated at the Utah
State Prison which have been considered by this court in recent
years.

Appellants contention in this case is not that some minor

infraction of her constitutional rights was perpetrated by the
sentencing courts, but rather that under the principles articulated
in the Shondel and Fair

cases the courts below exceeded its

jurisdiction in imposing a sentence of not to exceed five years in
prison in each case,

Consistent with the discussion of the Shondel
-8-

and Fair cases above, the sentencing court had no authority to
sentence court had no authority to sentence either for a term in
excess of one year or to the Utah State Prison.

The sentence

pronounced was void ab initio, at least to the extent that it
exceeds the lawful bounds provided for a Class A misdemeanor, this
defenct is rightfully subject to the collateral attack of a writ
of habeas corpus at any time while she remains in prison in excess
of the one year term.
The central question in this case is whether the sentencing
courts authority extended so far as to allow the court to assign
an indeterminate term in prison to the petitioner.

If, consonant

with Shondel and Fair, supra, the court was obliged to sentence
this offense as a Class A misdemeanor, than the passage of sentence
as a felony was improper and not a legitimate exercise of judicial
power.

If the sentence was illegitimate at the outset, then surely

the mere passage of time must not confer upon that sentence the patina
of legitimacy.
Courts have universally held that lack of jurisdiction is
a proper area of collateral attack by writ of habeas corpus.
Henry v. Henkel, 235 U.S. 219, 59 L. Ed. 203, 35 S. Ct. 54;
Riggins. V. United States 199 U.S. 547, 50 L. Ed. 303, 26 S. Ct. 147
Kelley v. Meyers, 124 Or. 322, 263 P.2d 903 further, the United States
Supreme Court has stated that proceedings in excess of lawful authority
are void and may be collaterally attacked as much as proceedings engaged
upon entirely without authority.

See Re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 9 S. Ct.

672, 33 L. Ed. 118, Re Reed 100 U.S. B.,

23 L. Ed. 538.

Furthermore, it has been widely had that the jurisdiction
of the court to make the particular order or judgment is a valid
subject of inquiry for a collateral attack.

As the Oregon Supreme

Court had occasion to say in the case of Huffman v. Alexander,
197 Or.283, 251 P.2a 87, rih den 197 Or. 331, 253 P.2d 289. (1952)
at page 94 that ". . . circumstances may arise in connection with
the criminal prosecution which will render the judgment void, even
though the court had jurisdiction in the narrow sense, over person
and subject matter at the inception of the proceedings."

See also

Ex Parte Cox 3 Idaho 530, 32 P. 197 (1893).
The situation that obtains is that the sentencing judge
sentenced in excess of their lawful authority.

That sentence was

void ab initio is appropriate for collateral attack.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons 'above stated, that the court below erred
in dismissing the above entitled action, the appellant requests
that the case be reversed and remanded for further action.
Respecttulry Submitted,

BRAD RICH
Attorney for Appellant

